Chapman University

Chapman University Digital Commons
Student Scholar Symposium Abstracts and
Posters

Center for Undergraduate Excellence

Fall 12-1-2021

Fear and Skepticism: A Changing Climate During the Trump Era
Devin Lopez
Chapman University, delopez@chapman.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/cusrd_abstracts
Part of the American Politics Commons

Recommended Citation
Lopez, Devin, "Fear and Skepticism: A Changing Climate During the Trump Era" (2021). Student Scholar
Symposium Abstracts and Posters. 487.
https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/cusrd_abstracts/487

This Poster is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for Undergraduate Excellence at Chapman
University Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Student Scholar Symposium Abstracts and
Posters by an authorized administrator of Chapman University Digital Commons. For more information, please
contact laughtin@chapman.edu.

Fear and Skepticism: A Changing Climate During the Trump Era
Devin Lopez – Advisor: Dr. Ann Gordon
Chapman University, Department of Political Science
*For space purposes, only sources specifically referenced on this
poster are included from my research.

Introduction
The climate science community has repeatedly sounded the alarm
on the climate crisis and global climate change for the past several
decades but with little to no response from political leaders. One of
the possible avenues for meaningful policy change by major
powers is through the pressure of public opinion and increased
sense of threat from the climate crisis. To understand the evolution
of public attitudes on climate change and the environment, this
study provides a look into the rhetoric by political elites and political
allegiances of various demographics from 2017 to 2020. Income,
education, age, party identification, and belief in the Bible are the
major factors analyzed and yield interesting trends in this 4-year
period.

Literature Review
General Demographics

• Income and education provided significant negative effects for
fear of climate change by those that identify as conservatives
(Ballew et al., 2020).
• Age yielded mixed results on its impact on climate views, though
the most recent studies imply increased climate change fear
among younger people (Hamilton et al., 2019; Blank & Shaw,
2015; Frumkin et al., 2012).
• Bible Interpretation: Strong negative relationships between
belief that the bible is literally true and acceptance of climate
science (Blank and Shaw, 2015).
• Republicans/Conservatives are much less likely to believe in
climate change or “global warming” and have higher opposition
to climate change mitigation policies (McCright, 2016).
• Democrats and Independents are more likely to be convinced
of climate science when directly exposed to it, while Republican
skepticism remained roughly the same even after exposure to
the same information (Schuldt et al., 2015; Hamilton et al., 2019)

Methods and Results
Table 1
Linear Regression on Fear of Climate Change, 2017 - 2020
2017

2018

2019

2020

-.190+
(-.099+)

-.116+
(-.075*)

-.173+
(-.046)

-.150+
(-.042)

Education

.055
(.014)

.150+
(.075*)

.109+
(-.018)

.129+
(.039)

Income

-.039
(-.036)

.042
(-.030)

.013
(.015)

-.040
(-.063*)

Party
.477+
Identification (0.258+)

.433+
(.214+)

.516+
(.336+)

.516+
(.265+)

Belief in the
Bible

.306+
(.103+)

.299+
(.118+)

.348+
(.123+)

Age

Note. Top values are single linear regression coefficients
while those in parentheses are the multiple linear regression
values for a Standard Coefficient (B).
*p < 0.05 level
+p < 0.001 level

Anti-Reflexivity Hypothesis
•

McCright and Dunlap popularized the anti-reflexivity hypothesis
in their analysis of conservative and wealthy economic interests’
attempts to curb environmentalist movements through the news
media and appeals to political conservatism.

Hypotheses
H1: Republicans are more likely to not fear climate change and
have lower environmental concern, while Democrats will hold the
opposite attitudes.
H2: Age will provide a negative relationship to fear of climate
change and environmental concern, regardless of partisanship.
H3: Belief that the Bible is literally true, word-for-word, will cause
lower fear of climate change and lower one’s environmentalism.
H4: The factor of Bible belief will be an even stronger indicator of
fear of climate change and environmental concern than
partisanship.

• Source: Chapman Survey on American Fears, survey
years 2017 – 2020.
• Fear of Climate Change ranged from 1 = “Not Afraid”,
to 4 = “Very Afraid”.
• Environmental Concern is an index of 5 questions.
For each question that a person responds 3 or 4 to
on the survey, they are assigned a point on the 0 – 5
index scale. These questions include fear of Air
Pollution, Drinking Water Pollution, River/Lake and
Ocean Pollution, Extinction of Plant/Animal Species,
and Oil Spills.
• A response of 1 on the bible belief question is the
interpretation of the Bible as being literally true, wordfor-word, while a response of 4 is the belief that Bible
is flawed and an ancient book of myth.
• Party identification is on a 7-point scale, with Strong
Republicans valued as 1, and Strong Democrats
valued at 7.
General Population’s Fear of Climate Change

Party Identification and Ideology
• Partisanship, as expected, saw a positive and moderately
strong relationship to fear of climate change. With a B of
.516 in the 2020 survey, Democrats were more likely than
Republicans to fear climate change and a B of .361 in the
same year indicates higher environmental concern among
Democrats than Republicans.
Age
• Older individuals are less likely to fear climate change and
have lower environmental concern.
• Age was statistically significant in predicting fear of climate
change for all 4 survey years, making it one of the more
stable variables tested.
Bible Belief
• Belief in the Bible became a much stronger predictor of
climate change fear and environmental concern across the
4 years of data, marking the Evangelical and Christian
Conservative movement’s increased allegiance to President
Trump by the end of his presidency.
• Strong Bible belief affirms the End Times Theology
argument that religious conservatives are more likely to
reject climate science and not be afraid of relating topics.
• H4 was made void by this study; while the variable grew
stronger over time, party identification remains the premiere
indicator of climate and environmental attitudes contrary to
speculations by scholars in this field.
General
• Climate change fear had an upward trend and appeared to
follow the rhetoric by Democrats during the 2018 midterm
elections in their opposition to President Trump’s climate
policies.
• The COVID-19 pandemic appears to have reduced overall
climate fears in the 2020 survey year. Further research to
measure climate fears in this and future survey years may
be able to solve the sudden dip as shown in the figures.

• Not Afraid includes responses of 1 and 2, Afraid
includes responses of 3 and 4.
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Table 2
Linear Regression on Environmental Concern, 2017 - 2020
2017

2018

2019

2020

-.175+
(-.086*)

-.065*
(-.029)

-.114+
(-.031)

-.180+
(-.087*)

-.059*
(-.054)

.046
(-.008)

-.034
(-.071*)

-.001
(.006)

Income

-.131+
(-.094+)

-.052
(-.088*)

-.139+
(-.111+)

-.183+
(-.168+)

Party
Identification

.322+
(.103*)

.260+
(.075)

.343+
(.224+)

.351+
(.206+)

Belief in the
Bible

.169+
(.030)

.199+
(.075*)

.190+
(.093*)

.252+
(.122+)

End Times Theology

• In modern conservative think tanks, religion has made itself the
center of political argument and is one of primary arguments
against combating climate change with national policy.
• Religious leaders of conservative religions often argue that when
God makes his Second Coming, he will judge us by our
character rather than our protection of the environment.

.247+
(.060*)

Age
Education

Discussion

General Population’s Environmental Concern

Note. Top values are single linear regression models while
those in parentheses are the multiple linear regression
values for a Standard Coefficient (B).
*p < 0.05 level
+p < 0.001 level
• Low index score is valued 0 – 1, moderate 2 - 3, high
4 – 5.
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